The iterative conception of set is typically considered to provide the intuitive underpinnings for ZFCU (ZFC+Urelements). It is an easy theorem of ZFCU that all sets have a definite cardinality. But the iterative conception seems to be entirely consistent with the existence of “wide” sets, sets (of, in particular, urelements) that are larger than any cardinal. This paper diagnoses the source of the apparent disconnect here and proposes modifications of the Replacement and Powerset axioms so as to allow for (...) the existence of wide sets. Drawing upon Cantor’s notion of the absolute infinite, the paper argues that the modifications are warranted and preserve a robust iterative conception of set. The resulting theory is proved consistent relative to ZFC + “there exists an inaccessible cardinal number.”. (shrink)

We introduce combinatorial principles that characterize strong compactness and supercompactness for inaccessible cardinals but also make sense for successor cardinals. Their consistency is established from what is supposedly optimal. Utilizing the failure of a weak version of a square, we show that the best currently known lower bounds for the consistency strength of these principles can be applied.

The classical doctrine that the moral virtues are unified is widely rejected. Some argue that the virtues are disunified, or even mutually incompatible. And though others have argued that the virtues form some sort of unity, these recent defenses of unity are always qualified, advocating only a partial unity: the unity of the virtues is limited to certain practical domains, or weak in that one virtue implies only moral decency in the fields of other virtues. I argue that something like (...) the classical doctrine—a full unity of the virtues thesis—remains defensible. After reviewing the arguments of partial unity theorists for the claim that the virtues form at least some sort of unity, I examine their main arguments for thinking that this unity is only partial (limited or weak). I then show that these arguments fail, and address some further criticisms (such as the argument that full unity implausibly requires that a person must attain the virtues “all at once”). I do not seek here to prove the truth of the full unity thesis (in fact I suggest a modification of it), but only to refute important extant criticisms of it, and thus to show that it remains a plausible view. (shrink)

We describe an infinitary logic for metric structures which is analogous to Lω1,ω. We show that this logic is capable of expressing several concepts from analysis that cannot be expressed in finitary continuous logic. Using topological methods, we prove an omitting types theorem for countable fragments of our infinitary logic. We use omitting types to prove a two-cardinal theorem, which yields a strengthening of a result of Ben Yaacov and Iovino concerning separable quotients of Banach spaces.

The response mode bias, in which subjects exhibit different risk attitudes when assessing certainty equivalents versus indifference probabilities, is a well-known phenomenon in the assessment of utility functions. In this empirical study, we develop and apply a cardinal measure of risk attitudes to analyze not only the existence, but also the strength of this phenomenon. Since probability levels involved in decision problems are already known to have a strong impact on behavior, we use this approach to study the impact (...) of probabilities on the extent of the response mode bias. We find that the direction in which probabilities influence measured risk aversion is the opposite in the certainty equivalence (CE) method versus in the probability equivalence (PE) method. Utilizing the CE elicitation approach leads to an increase of risk seeking for gambles involving high probabilities. For the PE method, subjects tend to behave risk averse with gambles of high probabilities. This behavior is reversed in the gain domain. This “tailwhip” effect is consistently replicated in several experiments, involving both loss and gain domains of lotteries. (shrink)

Alisdair Macintyre's defense of the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas offers a way to answer the question "What is the good of history?" By his use of dialectical reasoning in defense of the Thomist tradition, Macintyre helps Catholic historians to see that the good of history comes from its being a handmaiden to tradition. The writings of St. Bede the Venerable and John Henry Cardinal Newman are used as examples of how Catholic historians can know and draw (...) upon their own tradition. (shrink)

We study the problem of existence and generic existence of ultrafilters on ω. We prove a conjecture of $J\ddot{o}rg$ Brendle's showing that there is an ultrafilter that is countably closed but is not an ordinal ultrafilter under CH. We also show that Canjar's previous partial characterization of the generic existence of Q-points is the best that can be done. More simply put, there is no normal cardinal invariant equality that fully characterizes the generic existence of Q-points. We then sharpen (...) results on generic existence with the introduction of $\sigma-compact$ ultrafilters. We show that the generic existence of said ultrafilters is equivalent to $\delta = c$ . This result taken along with our result that there exists a $K_{\sigma}$ non-countably closed ultrafilter under CH, expands the size of the class of ultrafilters that were known to fit this description before. From the core of the proof, we get a new result on the cardinal invariants of the continuum, i.e., the cofinality of the sets with $\sigma-compact$ closure is δ. (shrink)

This essay addresses the first century of English colonization of the North American mainland. Rather than narrate a familiar story of events--migration, settlement, the creation of viable Anglophone cultures amid hardship and danger--it pursues a less familiar track by examining the terms upon which English adventurers and their contemporaries understood the world they inhabited, the process of transatlantic expansion upon which they were engaged, and, in particular, the justifications they espoused for their appropriations of space from its existing inhabitants. My (...) examination concentrates in particular on the conjoined discourses, literary and legal, in which the meanings of those terms are most clearly displayed. Through analysis of Shakespeare's early play Titus Andronicus, I demonstrate the salience of Tudor political economy--principally of sovereign power and invasion, of land and inhabitation, and of the city and barbarism--to the discourse of early-modern English colonizing. I show how the same complex of ideas animated the founding legal texts of English "settlement," revealed in the jurisdictional structures created and spaces occupied by the projectors of colonies. Finally, through reference to another foundational text, not of colonizing but of modern American legal history, I show the cardinal importance to contemporary America's historical self-construction of a refusal to acknowledge America's historical origins in a political economy of "colonization" and its violence, and its preference for a narrative of "energy" and "freedom" and their occlusion of violence. (shrink)

Daniel Russell's Practical Intelligence and the Virtues is principally a defense of the Aristotelian claim that phronesis is part of every unqualified virtue—a defense of what Russell calls "hard virtue theory" and "hard virtue ethics." The main support for this is the further claim that we would be unable to act well reliably, or form our character reliably, without phronesis performing its "twin roles": correctly identifying the mean of each virtue, and integrating the mean of each virtue with those of (...) others so as to enable us to act in an overall virtuous manner. In following Russell's argument for these claims, we find much else of interest, including a persuasive account of right action and a resurrection of the old doctrine of cardinal virtues. Here I seek first to give readers a sense of the range and depth of this important book by summarizing the main lines of its argument. But I also raise some critical points, the most substantive of which concern his treatments of the unity of the virtues and of responsibility for character. (shrink)

Scientific models are often said to be more or less general depending on how many cases they cover. In this paper we argue that the cardinality of cases is insufficient as a metric of generality, and we present a novel account based on measure theory. This account overcomes several problems with the cardinality approach, and additionally provides some insight into the nature of assessments of generality. Specifically, measure theory affords a natural and quantitative way of describing local spaces of possibility. (...) The generality of models can be understood as the measure of possibilities to which the models apply. In order to illustrate our view, we consider the example of structural genomics, the ongoing project of building three-dimensional models of biological macromolecules like proteins. Using measure theory, we interpret the practice of homology modeling, where such models are understood to apply widely but imperfectly to the space of possible proteins. (shrink)

We investigate a variety of cut and choose games, their relationship with (generic) large cardinals, and show that they can be used to characterize a number of properties of ideals and of partial orders: certain notions of distributivity, strategic closure, and precipitousness.

Memory for numbers improves with age. One source of this improvement may be learning linear spatial-numeric associations, but previous evidence for this hypothesis likely confounded memory span with quality of numerical magnitude representations and failed to distinguish spatial-numeric mappings from other numeric abilities, such as counting or number word-cardinality mapping. To obviate the influence of memory span on numerical memory, we examined 39 3- to 5-year-olds’ ability to recall one spontaneously produced number (1-20) after a delay, and the relation between (...) numeric recall (controlling for non-numeric recall) and quality of mapping between symbolic and non-symbolic quantities using number-line estimation, give-a-number estimation, and counting tasks. Consistent with previous reports, mapping of numerals to space, to discrete quantities, and to numbers in memory displayed a logarithmic-to-linear shift. Also, linearity of spatial-numeric mapping correlated strongly with multiple measures of numeric recall (percent correct and percent absolute error), even when controlling for age and non-numeric memory. Results suggest that linear spatial-numeric mappings may aid memory for number over and above children’s other numeric skills. (shrink)

In the last homily he gave before becoming Pope Benedict XVI, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger described modern life as ruled by a “dictatorship of relativism which does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely” of satisfying “the desires of one’s own ego.” An eminent scholar familiar with the centuries-old debates over relativism, Ratzinger chose to oversimplify or even caricature a philosophical approach of great sophistication and antiquity. His homily depicts the relativist as someone blown about “by (...) every wind of doctrine,” whereas the relativist sticks firmly to one argument—that human knowledge is not absolute. Gathering prominent intellectuals from disciplines most relevant to the controversy—ethics, theology, political theory, anthropology, psychology, cultural studies, epistemology, philosophy of science, and classics—this special double issue of _Common Knowledge_ contests Ratzinger’s denunciation of relativism. One essay relates the arguments of Ratzinger to those of two other German scholars—the conservative political theorist Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde and the liberal philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas—since all three men assume that social order depends on the existence of doctrinal authority. The contributors here argue for an intellectual and social life free of the desire for an “infantilizing” authority. One proposes that the Christian god is a relativist who prefers limitation and ambiguity; another, initially in agreement with Ratzinger about the danger relativism poses to faith and morals, then argues that this danger is what makes relativism valuable. The issue closes with the first English translation of an extract from a book on Catholic-Jewish relations by Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini, one of the Catholic Church’s most progressive figures. _Contributors_. David Bloor, Daniel Boyarin, Mary Baine Campbell, Lorraine Daston, Arnold I. Davidson, John Forrester, Kenneth J. Gergen, Simon Goldhill, Jeffrey F. Hamburger, Julia Kristeva, Carlo Maria Cardinal Martini, Christopher Norris, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Richard Shusterman, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Jeffrey Stout, Gianni Vattimo. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to make a rhetorical analysis of the op-ed entitled «Finding Design in Nature» by Cardinal Christoph Schönborn, Archbishop of Vienna, published by The New York Times in 2005, three months after the death of John Paul II. In this essay, the Cardinal states that it is an error to affirm that Catholic doctrine is compatible with the «neo-Darwinist» theory of evolution and that the Roman Catholic Church accepts that theory. For (...) the Archbishop, the origin of this error lies in the abuses committed in the interpretation of John Paul’s 1996 speech in which the Pope affirmed that evolution was more than a hypothesis and showed himself more favourable towards evolutionary theory than his predecessors. In his article the Cardinal described that papal message as «vague and unimportant». In this paper, the rhetorical techniques used by Schönborn in his article are analysed: the lexical choices to make a negative assessment of «neo Darwinist» evolutionary theory; the argumentative definition to make a polemical description of that theory; and the polyphonic proceedures designed to decontextualise the papal discourse and present Catholic beliefs as the truth. We interpret Cardinal Schönborn’s position as a rhetorical change with respect to John Paul II’s 1996 speech. From our point of view, the Archbishop directed his criticism against evolutionary theory not only because of its scientific theories (not rejected by Church teaching) but also for being potentially dangerous in its use by certain authors as a scientific argument in defence of their atheism. (shrink)

I present a controversy surrounding the cardinal Christoph Schönborn's op-ed article in New York Times, titled "Finding Design in Nature". In his paper, Schön-born challenges the claim that pope John Paul II accepted neodarwinian evolution as a possible method of God's creation of life forms and, especially, human beings. Moreover, cardinal says that neodarwinism contradicts Christian doctrine of creation. In Schönborn's view, neodarwinism excludes the possibility that there is a real design in nature and this (...) is contradictory to the Catholic Church's stand that this design could be and is recognizable by human reason. I argue, just like cardinal Schönborn, that neodarwinism actually is incompatible with the Christian doctrine of creation. I find also that his views, as well as some of the recent utterances of pope Benedict XVI, echoes the claims of intelligent design theory's proponents, who are skeptical of neodarwinism's validity and argue that they formulated scientific methods of detection of design in nature. Therefore, one can have a valid suspicion that these two leading hierarchs of Catholic Church attempt, though not explicitly, to embrace intelligent design theory as an appropriate view of origins for Christians in contrast with the currently dominating scientific view of biological evolution. (shrink)

This volume develops a unique framework to understand India through indigenous and European perspectives, and examines how it copes with the larger challenges of a globalized world. Through a discussion of religious and philosophical traditions, cultural developments as well as contemporary theatre, films and media, it explores the manner in which India negotiates the trials of globalization. It also focuses upon India’s school and education system, its limitations and successes, and how it prepares to achieve social inclusion. The work further (...) shows how contemporary societies in both India and Europe deal with cultural diversity and engage with the tensions between tendencies towards homogenization and diversity. This eclectic collection on what it is to be a part of global network will be of interest to scholars and researchers of South Asian studies, philosophy, sociology, culture studies, and religion. (shrink)

Der Gedanke, der sich in der modernen Idee der Autonomie verdichtet, ist ein doppelter: Die Figur der Autonomie enthält zugleich eine neue Auffassung von Normativität und eine eigene Konzeption von Freiheit. Dem Gedanken der Autonomie zufolge ist ein Gesetz, das wahrhaft normativ ist, eines, als dessen Urheber wir uns selbst betrachten können; und eine Freiheit, die im vollen Sinne wirklich ist, drückt sich in Gestalt eben solcher selbstgegebener Gesetze aus. Die Idee der Autonomie artikuliert so die Einsicht, dass man Freiheit (...) und Gesetz nicht durch ihre Entgegensetzung bestimmen kann, sondern durcheinander erläutern muss. Wirkliche Freiheit ist nicht Freiheit von Gesetzen, sondern Freiheit in Gesetzen; verbindliche Normen sind nicht das, was Freiheit äußerlich beschränkt, sondern das, was Freiheit innerlich verwirklicht. Die Idee der Autonomie, die für die moderne praktische Philosophie seit Rousseau und Kant grundlegend ist, zielt so darauf, Freiheit und Verbindlichkeit in einem Zuge zu artikulieren: durch die Form selbstgegebener Gesetze. Mit Beiträgen von Robert Brandom, Judith Butler, Thomas Khurana, Christoph Menke, Terry Pinkard und Sebastian Rödl. (shrink)

I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived (...) of as a feature of mind-independent reality. I suggest that in fact there is no such phenomenology of passage in the first place. There is, however, a specific structural aspect of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of movement and change that can explain how one might mistakenly come to the belief that such experiences do involve a phenomenology of passage. (shrink)

An influential thought-experiment by Derek Parfit sought to establish that people have a preference for unpleasant events to lie in the past rather than the future. In recent discussions of Parfit’s argument, this purported preference is modelled as a discounting phenomenon, as is the tensed emotion of relief, which Arthur Prior argued demonstrated that there is an objective metaphysical difference between the past and the future. Looking at recent work demonstrating some psychological past/future asymmetries that are more clearly instances of (...) discounting I argue that this existing philosophical literature fails to distinguish between what are clearly two quite different psychological phenomena. This affects recent attempts to respond to Prior’s metaphysical argument, because it is not clear that they have identified the right phenomenon to be explained. It also affects Parfit’s thought-experiment, because the purported unitary ‘preference’ may in fact be an amalgam of these two quite different psychological phenomena. (shrink)

In this chapter, I discuss some ways in which debates about temporal experience intersect with wider debates about the nature of perception in general. In particular, I suggest that bearing in mind some general questions about the nature of perception can help with demarcating different theoretical approaches to temporal experience. Much of the current debate about temporal experience in philosophy is framed in terms of a debate between three specific main positions sometimes referred to as the extensional model, the retentional (...) model and the cinematic model. It is typically assumed that the differences between these three models are obvious. Yet, on closer inspection, it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make out what exactly distinguishes the cinematic model from the extensional one, on the one hand, and from the retentional model, on the other. I criticise some existing ways in which the models are sometimes demarcated from one another, before suggesting that the differences between the three views become clearer if the debate between them is seen as turning on contrasting pictures of the nature of perceptual experience they embody. (shrink)

Instead of simply following the current neoliberal mantra of proclaiming economic growth as the single most important factor for maintaining well-being, Education and Schmid's Art of Living revisits the idea of an education focused on personal development and the well-being of human beings. Drawing on philosophical ideas concerning the good life and recent research in positive psychology, Teschers argues in favour of shifting the focus in education and schooling towards a beautiful life and an art of living for today's students. (...) Containing a thorough discussion of the ideas of contemporary German philosopher Wilhelm Schmid, this book considers the possible implications of developing a more humanistic and life-centred approach to educational policy, research and practice, showing that Schmid's concept of Lebenskunst provides a firm philosophical basis for this endeavour. Among others, this book draws on analytical and continental traditions to challenge current views and assumptions in regard to education and the role of schooling for contemporary societies. As a result, Teschers' work is sure to spark a debate about the direction of educational policy and practice in the 21st century. Education and Schmid's Art of Living is essential reading for academics and students with an interest in education. Given the importance of such topics as the relationship between education and society, teacher education and how best to structure schools and learning environments, Teschers' work will appeal to academics and students in a diverse range of fields, including education, philosophy, sociology and psychology. (shrink)

Variants of the slogan that a succession of experiences does not amount to an experience of succession are commonplace in the philosophical literature on temporal experience. I distinguish three quite different arguments that might be captured using this slogan: the individuation argument, the unity argument, and the causal argument. Versions of the unity and the causal argument are often invoked in support of a particular view of the nature of temporal experience sometimes called intentionalism, and against a rival view sometimes (...) called extensionalism. I examine these arguments in light of the individuation argument. In particular, I show that the individuation argument is, at least prima facie, neutral between those two views of temporal experience; and once the individuation argument is in place, the unity and causal argument also lose their force against extensionalism. (shrink)

_Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation_ offers a resolution of one of the most vexing problems in Nietzsche scholarship. As perhaps the most significant predecessor of more recent attempts to formulate a postmetaphysical epistemology and ontology, Nietzsche is considered by many critics to share this problem with his successors: How can an antifoundationalist philosophy avoid vicious relativism and legitimate its claim to provide a platform for the critique of arguments, practices, and institutions? Christoph Cox argues that Nietzsche successfully navigates between relativism (...) and dogmatism, accepting the naturalistic critique of metaphysics and theology provided by modern science, yet maintaining that a thoroughgoing naturalism must move beyond scientific reductionism. It must accept a central feature of aesthetic understanding: acknowledgment of the primacy and irreducibility of interpretation. This view of Nietzsche's doctrines of perspectivism, becoming, and will to power as products of an overall naturalism balanced by a reciprocal commitment to interpretationism will spur new discussions of epistemology and ontology in contemporary thought. (shrink)

RATIONAL ALTRUISM. A PRUDENTIAL THEORY OF RATIONALITY AND ALTRUISM - STRUCTURE: "Rational altruism" is the attempt to develop and rationally justify moral principles - with a very strong emphasis on this justification. The concept of justification is developed in a metaethical part (ch. 2); it requires recourse to prudential decisions and to information about our decision-making procedures. The actual normative ethics (Ch. 6 and especially 7) is therefore still based on a prudential desirability theory (Ch. 4 and Sections 5.5-5.6) and (...) this in turn on an empirical action theory (Ch. 3 and Sections 5.1-5.4). - METAETHICS (Ch. 2): In the metaethical part of the book, conditions of adequacy for cogent moral justifications are first developed and justified, which demand, among other things, an information-stable motivation through cogent moral justifications (internalist moral justification). After an examination of various approaches to justification in ethics with regard to this adequacy condition and the negative outcome of this examination, an alternative solution strategy is presented. Among other things, the rationality requirements of profane rational reasoning approaches in ethics are to be systematically reinforced by a prudential desirability theory that aims at information-stable evaluations. - EMPIRICAL THEORY OF ACTION (Chapter 3 and Sections 5.1-5.4): The empirical theory of action developed here therefore provides a detailed analysis of the regularities and leeway of our decisions, especially the influence of information on decision-making paths. - PRUDENTIAL DESIRABILITY THEORY (Chapter 4 and Sections 5.5-5.6): In the prudential desirability theory, the 'individual desirability' of events, especially actions, is then defined in such a way that, of the various evaluation possibilities, the one that is stable in terms of information is always chosen. This procedure far exceeds the rationality requirements of rational decision theory, for example. - NORMATIVE ETHICS (chap. 6 and especially 7): Finally, in the actual normative ethics, a prioritarian standard for the moral evaluation of actions, norms and entire social orders is developed, called "Utilex". Utilex is based on compassion and, like compassion, is partial to the worse off, the poor and unfortunate, but without neglecting the interests of the better off. (shrink)

The paper argues that an account of understanding should take the form of a Carnapian explication and acknowledge that understanding comes in degrees. An explication of objectual understanding is defended, which helps to make sense of the cognitive achievements and goals of science. The explication combines a necessary condition with three evaluative dimensions: An epistemic agent understands a subject matter by means of a theory only if the agent commits herself sufficiently to the theory of the subject matter, and to (...) the degree that the agent grasps the theory (i.e., is able to make use of it), the theory answers to the facts and the agent’s commitment to the theory is justified. The threshold for outright attributions of understanding is determined contextually. The explication has descriptive as well as normative facets and allows for the possibility of understanding by means of non-explanatory (e.g., purely classificatory) theories. (shrink)

Pour l'auteur, la Lettre représente un seuil décisif dans l'évolution de la théologie fondamentale moderne. Partant des trois acquis majeurs du projet blondélien , l'auteur propose une voie de réinterprétation dans une perspective culturelle nouvelle de ces acquis, notamment en raison du pluralisme qui semble d'abord s'opposer à la structure fondamentalement chrétienne du discours de Blondel, ce qui contraint à infléchir la définition blondélienne du surnaturel. Enfin, l'esquisse d'un argument apologétique valorise l'ensemble du processus circulaire de l'argument apologétique dans la (...) mesure où cet ensemble est constitué par vérité, justesse et authenticité : ce processus prend aujourd’hui son départ dans la consistance du comportement de celui qui engage l’argumentation en faveur de la foi chrétienne.For the author, the Lettre represents a decisive threshold in the evolution of fundamental modern theology. Starting with the three major accepted propositions of Blondel’s project , the author proposes a way of reinterpretation in a new cultural perspective of these propositions, notably because of a pluralism that seems at first to be opposed to the fundamentally Christian structure of Blondel’s discourse, which forces one to bend Blondel’s definition of the supernatural. Finally, the outline of an apologetical argument valorises the whole of the circular method of the apologetical argument in so far as this whole is constituted by truth, soundness, and authenticity. Today this method being with the consistency of the comportment of he who engages the argumentation in favour of the Christian faith. (shrink)

In apparent motion experiments, participants are presented with what is in fact a succession of two brief stationary stimuli at two different locations, but they report an impression of movement. Philosophers have recently debated whether apparent motion provides evidence in favour of a particular account of the nature of temporal experience. I argue that the existing discussion in this area is premised on a mistaken view of the phenomenology of apparent motion and, as a result, the space of possible philosophical (...) positions has not yet been fully explored. In particular, I argue that the existence of apparent motion is compatible with an account of the nature of temporal experience that involves a version of direct realism. In doing so, I also argue against two other claims often made about apparent motion, viz. that apparent motion is the psychological phenomenon that underlies motion experience in the cinema, and that apparent motion is subjectively indistinguishable from real motion. (shrink)

Leben und Werk des Berner Staatstheoretikers und politischen Schriftstellers Karl Ludwig von Haller sind bisher nur ungenugend untersucht. Die fruhere wissenschaftliche Betrachtung beschrankte sich einseitig auf sein Restaurationswerk. Weiter fehlt bis heute eine Biographie Hallers. Eine erneute Betrachtung seiner Anschauungen und eine Biographie erfordern aber zuerst eine vollstandige Sichtung und Auswertung der vorhandenen Quellen. Die Untersuchung von Hallers publizistischem Wirken bis 1815 zeigt, wie viele unbekannte und unbeachtete Quellen der Forschung bisher verschlossen waren. Weiter weist die Darstellung nach, dass Haller (...) zuerst als Gegenrevolutionar zu verstehen ist, der seine Staatstheorie als Antwort auf die Zerstorung der alten Ordnung durch Revolution formulierte.". (shrink)

Time and Memory throws new light on fundamental aspects of human cognition and consciousness by bringing together, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches dealing with the connection between the capacity to represent and think about time, and the capacity to recollect the past. Fifteen specially written essays offer insights into current theories of memory processes and of the mechanisms and cognitive abilities underlying temporal judgements, and draw out key issues concerning the phenomenology and epistemology of memory and its (...) role in our understanding of time. (shrink)

Promotion of pro-social attitudes and moral behaviour is a crucial and challenging task for social orders. As traditional ways such as moral education have some, but apparently and unfortunately only limited effect, some authors have suggested employing biomedical means such as pharmaceuticals or electrical stimulation of the brain to alter individual psychologies in a more direct way — moral bioenhancement. One of the salient questions in the nascent ethical debate concerns the impact of such interventions on human freedom. Advocates argue (...) that moral bioenhancements do not pose a serious threat to freedom. This contention, however, is based on an overly narrow, if not impoverished, sense of freedom, which comprises only freedom of action and freedom of will. Mind-altering interventions primarily affect another sense of freedom: freedom of mind, a concept that has not received much attention although it should rank among the most important legal and political freedoms. The article introduces three senses of mental freedom potentially infringed upon by moral bioenhancement and places it in a broader perspective. Ignorance of mental freedom has far-ranging consequences for the shape of the political and legal order at large. As many advocates are apparently not aware of the freedoms they seek to undermine, their calls for moral enhancement programmes are dangerously premature. (shrink)

The article outlines a general epistemological theory of argument: a theory that regards providingjustified belief as the principal aim of argumentation, and defends it instrumentalistically. After introducing some central terms of such a theory (2), answers to its central questions are proposed: the primary object and structure of the theory (3), the function of arguments, which is to lead to justified belief (4), the way such arguments function, which is to guide the addressee's cognizing (5), objective versus subjective aspects of (...) argumentation (6), designing different types of argument (7). Then the notion of '(argumentatively) valid argument' is defined and criteria for the adequate use of such arguments are introduced (8). Finally, this conception is justified as, among others, leading to more true beliefs than competing conceptions (9). (shrink)

The notion of the absolute time-constituting flow plays a central role in Edmund Husserl’s analysis of our consciousness of time. I offer a novel reading of Husserl’s remarks on the absolute flow, on which Husserl can be seen to be grappling with two key intuitions that are still at the centre of current debates about temporal experience. One of them is encapsulated by what is sometimes referred to as an intentionalist (as opposed to an extensionalist) approach to temporal experience. The (...) other centres on the thought that temporal experience itself necessarily unfolds over time. I show how some of Husserl’s more enigmatic-sounding remarks about the absolute flow become intelligible if they are read as attempts to accommodate both these intuitions at the same time. However, I also question whether Husserl ultimately provides good reasons for preferring his intentionalist approach to a rival extensionalist one. (shrink)

This book dispels popular understandings of Buddhism as a religion that emphasizes the renunciation of worldly goods, by examining how Buddhist temples and the monastic community (the sangha) require tangible resources in order to sustain themselves. The first book to focus on the material and financial relations of contemporary Buddhist monks, nuns, temples, and laypeople, it shows that rather than being peripheral, economic exchanges are often central to the relations between Buddhist monastics and laity, and are a key topic of (...) religious debate. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork from India over Russia to Japan, and including all three major Buddhist traditions, the book focuses on the flows of goods and services between clergy and laity, the management of resources, the treatment of cash, and the role of the state in temple economies. Along with documenting ritual and economic practices, these accounts engage with the anxieties and challenges facing Buddhist societies in the contemporary era and dispel the romantic notion of the Buddhist monk. (shrink)

The study reconstructs the concept of the image as the basic concept of Plato's philosophy. Within the overall framework of this philosophy of the image, the appearance of the invisible in itself rather than the depiction of the likewise visible proves to be its uniform core. The picture thus moves into the direct vicinity of the body and is finally integrated into the ontology of the sequence of dimensions. This implies far-reaching reinterpretations of the line and cave parables as well (...) as art criticism and establishes systematic references to the ontology of ideas, to the philosophy of language and the doctrine of parables as well as to Plato's own dialogue design. Plato's concept of the image is thus not merely a deprecating figure of thought, but constitutively dialectical: he formulates not only the differentiation of reality, but also the connection between the sensual and the spiritual, and consequently the unity of reality. Understanding the sensual world as an image does not mean declaring it meaningless or worthless, but to really come to terms with it. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt's 1949 essay on the critique of human rights was published in English and German in the same year under two quite different titles: while in English the title asks the skeptical question: "'The Rights of Man'. What Are They?", the German title claims: "Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht " - "there is only one human right". The article shows that the English title's skepticism and the German title's assertion represent two internally connected moves of Arendt's argument. For (...) Arendt aims at a fundamental critique of the modern natural law tradition of human rights which, at the same time, hints at a possible alternative understanding of a " right to have rights" in terms of a political anthropology - a new understanding of human dignity. (shrink)